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Foreword
It gives me great pleasure to write the 
foreword to this important, ground 
breaking study by the Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies. The fact that, in the year 
2009, this is the first cross-economy study 
of the effectiveness of arrangements to 
stop fraud and prevent losses, is shocking.
As the former Minister, I had responsibility 
for fraud in social security. I prioritised 
the issue because I knew from my own 
constituency that failing to prevent fraud 
effectively has a dual negative impact. 
It has a serious corrupting effect on 
human behaviour while at the same 
time denying all of us the resources 
to make our society a better place.
And yet, there is a pretty shocking 
reluctance to act effectively in this area. 
As a Minister I recall hearing the view 
expressed (sometimes in the same 
breath) that, on the one hand fraud was 
not a serious issue, but that even if it 
was, nothing could be done about it! 
Against that background it is no wonder 
that fraud involving sub-prime mortgages 
has emerged as an important cause of 
our current recession. The mis-selling of 
so-called NINJA mortgages in the United 
States to people with No Income No Job or 
Assets (and therefore no ability to repay 
them!) lead to massive foreclosures and, 
according to the International Monetary 
Fund, financial institutions around the 
world holding $4.1 trillion in securities 
that will have to be written off.
This Report starts to give us the 
ammunition to take fraud seriously. 
Benchmarking has become the norm in 
other areas of life. Whether we are citizens, 
consumers, employees, shareholders 
or taxpayers, what we need to know 
is how careful the organisations and 
companies we rely on are being to protect 
themselves against fraud. The current 
lack of care that most show, leads directly 
to us incurring extra unnecessary costs, 
receiving worse public services, having 
less secure jobs, or benefiting from a 
worse return on our investments.
A recent study by the Association of 
British Insurers estimated that we all 
pay 6% on our insurance premiums as a 
result of the cost of fraud. They are to 
be congratulated for their research in 
this area, but not for what they found! 
Tackling fraud does not have to be a 
negative story. There are some important 
examples of the positive benefits from 
tackling fraud effectively. For example, 
the work that one of the authors of this 
Report was involved with, Jim Gee, in 
setting up a new Counter Fraud Service 
in the NHS. Over eight years, fraud losses 
were reduced by up to 60%, delivering 
over £800 million of financial benefits 
to be spent on better patient care.
However, much, much more needs to be 
done. The Government has established 
a new National Fraud Authority to 
provide leadership, but their work 
must be informed by high quality 
research about the current position.
This Report starts to provide what is 
needed. I hope its’ authors will quickly 
complete a second, more in-depth study 
and, again place their findings in the 
public domain, so that, we all, as citizens, 
can make the necessary judgements.
Right Honourable Frank Field M.P.
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lntroduction
This Report was commissioned by Rt. Hon. 
Frank Field M.P. from Jim Gee and the Centre 
for Counter Fraud Studies at University of 
Portsmouth. The data on which it is based 
was derived from official survey responses 
from the organisations concerned. 
Research has suggested that fraud could 
cost the UK anything from £14 billion to £72 
billion per year.¹ Whatever the figure, it is 
a huge drain on the nation’s finances, not 
to mention the damage fraud does to the 
performance and reputation of organisations. 
As fraud becomes a higher profile issue, 
it seemed the appropriate time to assess 
the resilience of UK Plc to fraud. There 
have been a number of assessments of 
different organisations counter fraud 
strategies, but what the authors felt 
was needed was for an assessment to 
be made across the economy, based 
upon commonly accepted standards. 
Rationale and methods
The Chartered Institute for Public 
Finance and Accountancy’s (CIPFA) 
Better Governance Forum have produced 
‘Managing the Risk of Fraud - Actions 
to Counter Fraud and Corruption’. This 
document represents the most extensive 
set of professional standards for counter 
fraud work ever produced. The standards 
set out what an organisation should do to 
counter fraud successfully under 5 sections: 
Adopting the right strategy •	
Accurately identifying the risks •	
Creating and maintaining •	
a strong structure 
Taking action to tackle the problem •	
Defining success •	
Ideally the research team would have liked 
to conduct a dedicated survey of public, 
private and voluntary organisations to 
assess to what extent they apply all the 
standards set out by CIPFA. For future years 
it is intended that such a survey will be 
undertaken, however, as a starting point 
and baseline, existing, available information 
has been used to construct this Report. 
¹ Fraud Review Team (2006b) Final Report. 
Retrieved July 28, 2006 from www.lslo.
gov.uk/pdf/FraudReview.pdf; Levi, M., 
Burrows, J., Fleming, H. & Hopkins, M. 
(2007). The Nature, Extent and Economic 
Impact of Fraud in the UK. London: ACPO.
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During 2006-7 the research team 
undertook a survey of Government 
Departments, Executive Agencies and 
Non-Departmental Public Bodies, as well 
as the FTSE 100 companies. The survey 
assessed the counter fraud strategies of 
these bodies. It produced a rich database 
of information concerning the strategies 
used in 135 public sector organisations 
with a combined budget of £129 billion 
and from 32 FTSE 100 companies with a 
combined turnover of £326 billion. In 2006 
total GDP for the UK economy amounted 
to £1,301.9 billion2, so, together, the 
organisations covered represent around 
one third (by value) of the UK economy.
The aim was to assess organisations on 
the basis of all of the CIPFA professional 
standards. However, the original data 
was not obtained using the CIPFA 
criteria, and thus the authors have 
decided to focus on 13 key standards 
which could be assessed. These were: 
Possession of a counter fraud strategy?1. 
Measures to assess the 2. 
effectiveness of the strategy?
Does the organisation assess 3. 
the counter fraud risks? 
Does the organisation assess 4. 
those risks at least annually? 
Does the organisation have a named 5. 
person responsible for counter fraud?
Does the named person report 6. 
to at least Chief Executive, Board 
or Audit Committee level?
Does the organisation have a dedicated 7. 
counter fraud/investigative function? 
Is there professional training 8. 
for those in this function?
Are recruitment checks for Counter 9. 
Fraud staff and contractors 
more thorough than for those 
recruited to ‘general’ posts? 
Is there a general programme 10. 
of fraud awareness training?
Are there whistle blowing 11. 
procedures in place?
Does the organisation investigate 12. 
suspected frauds?
Does the organisation seek to apply 13. 
sanctions beyond disciplinary staff 
sanctions to those who have been 
discovered to have committed fraud?
These standards are very important 
parts of what one would expect in fit for 
purpose counter fraud arrangements. 
It was therefore decided to assess the 
database of public and private bodies to 
ascertain how many of the 13 standards 
they met. To avoid accusations of bias 
the research team allocated 1 point to 
each of the 13, rather than weight them. 
Before the results are outlined, it would be 
worth setting out some caveats. First, the 
data for the public sector was collected 
between 2005-6 and the FTSE 100 in 2007. 
The quality of strategies may have therefore 
improved since then. Second, some of the 
responses from organisations were such 
that the assessment of, whether the body 
meets that requirement or not, were left 
to subjective judgement. However, where 
this has occurred the research team have 
erred on the side of the organisation 
and in that sense it may present a better 
picture of the reality at that time. 
To reiterate, the research team do not see 
this Report as the definitive assessment of 
UK Plc’s resilience to fraud, rather as an 
exercise that will stimulate debate about 
the strength of UK Plc’s counter fraud 
infra-structure and as a forerunner to a 
much more comprehensive assessment. 
Results 
Before the results of the exercise are 
set out it would be worth identifying 
what the financial value of the 
organisations assessed amounted to. 
FTSE 100 - £326 billion•	
Central Government •	
Bodies - £129 billion 
As stated above, UK GDP in 2006 was 
£1,301.9 billion and total government 
expenditure for 2005-2006 was £481.9 
billion3. The survey does therefore 
represent a significant snapshot of UK Plc. 
² House of Commons Library 
Research Papers (2007). Research 
Paper 07/83: Economic Indicators 
December 2007. Retrieved from 
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/
research/rp2007/rp07-083.pdf
³ Public Expenditure Statistical 
Analysis (2006). Retrieved from HM 
Treasury Website www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/d/cm6811_comp.pdf
Figure 1 and 2 set out the number of 
organisations that have achieved between 
0 and 13 points based upon the authors’ 
assessment. 
The figures show that the private sector 
performs generally better than the public 
sector. In the latter there are a significant 
number of bodies scoring 0 to 5 points, 
where as in the private sector the majority 
score 8 or more. 
Figure 1. Distribution of public 
sector organisations by score. 
Figure 2. Distribution of FTSE 
100 companies by score.
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Results
The authors would be concerned in most 
cases if bodies did not have all 13 actions. 
However, for the purposes of debate they 
decided that 8 or less posed a significant 
risk. The pie charts to the right show the 
significant proportion of organisations 
scoring 8 or less. 
The charts show that there would seem to 
be a bigger problem in the public sector 
with many more organisations not scoring 
9 or above. 
Figure 3. Public sector division between 
8 and below and 9 and above
Figure 4. FTSE 100 sector division 
between 8 and below and 9 and above.
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To highlight what is actually at risk the 
research team then calculated the points 
scored by turnover of the company in the 
case of FTSE 100 and expenditure in terms 
of public organisations. 
This shows that in the case of public bodies 
only 6 per cent of monies was at risk (8 or 
below), compared to 55 per cent with the 
FTSE 100. What this reveals is that in the 
public sector organisations assessed there 
were a larger number scoring 8 or less, 
but they were generally small. In the FTSE 
100 sample however, 8 or below was more 
evenly spread no matter what the size of 
the company. 
. 
Figure 5. Public sector division between 8 
and below and 9 and above by expenditure.
Figure 6. FTSE 100 sector division between 
8 and below and 9 and above by turnover.
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It would be useful now to examine the 13 
points and where organisations generally 
scored their points. As was mentioned 
earlier, the authors took the decision for 
methodological reasons not to rate each 
of the 13. However, there are some of 
these that clearly are more important than 
others. The bar charts illustrate where the 
organisations assessed secured their points.
The analysis shows the public sector 
bodies are best on the issues of whistle 
blowing and having a named person 
responsible for counter fraud. The weak 
points are professional training for 
counter fraud staff, having dedicated 
staff (although many are small bodies), 
having a counter fraud strategy and the 
assessment of their effectiveness. 
Figure 7. Number of the 135 public bodies 
meeting each of the 13 criteria. 
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For the FTSE 100 respondents the 
spread was much more even on the 
13 criteria. The weaker points were 
whether there were; measures to assess 
the effectiveness of the strategy, the 
employment of a dedicated function 
to investigate fraud and possession of 
training for those in that function.
Figure 8. Number of the 32 FTSE 100 
organisations meeting each of the 13 
criteria.
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It would now seem appropriate to pick out 
some of the more salient gaps. Having a 
counter fraud strategy is very important, 
but is even more important to assess the 
effectiveness of it, as many bodies may 
just have it ‘filed’. The pie charts reveal 
the number of organisations that regularly 
assess their strategy.
Figure 9. Percentage of public bodies 
assessing the effectiveness of their counter 
fraud strategy. 
 
Figure 10. Percentage of FTSE 100 
companies assessing the effectiveness of 
their counter fraud strategy.
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It is also important to regularly assess 
the risks of fraud to an organisation on a 
regular basis of at least yearly or better. As 
figures 11 and 12 show, in the public sector 
41 per cent did not do so, where as for the 
FTSE 100 respondents just under a third 
did not do so. Given the size of FTSE 100 
companies this is a much more worrying 
finding. 
Figure 11. Percentage of public bodies 
undertaking annual, or more frequent, 
assessments of fraud risks. 
Figure 12. Percentage of FTSE 100 
companies undertaking annual, or more 
frequent, assessments of fraud risks. 
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Figures 13 and 14 show whether the 
named person reports to at least the Chief 
Executive, Board or Audit Committee. This 
shows that in both sectors around a third 
does not have this arrangement in place. 
Given the public sector includes some of 
the smaller bodies this is concerning as 
one would expect a smaller hierarchy to 
enable this to happen. It is also a concern 
that a significant minority of the larger FTSE 
100 companies do not have appropriate 
reporting structure in place. 
Figure 13. Percentage of public bodies 
whose named counter fraud person reports 
direct to at least Chief Executive, Board or 
Audit Committee level.
 
Figure 14. Percentage of FTSE 100 whose 
named counter fraud person reports direct 
to at least Chief Executive, Board or Audit 
Committee level.
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Developing an anti-fraud culture is also 
a very important part of a counter fraud 
strategy and part of achieving that is the 
use of fraud awareness training for general 
staff. Here again about a third of the FTSE 
100 companies did not do this, which is a 
concern given their size. For public bodies 
over half did not, which is also a major 
concern. 
Figure 15. Percentage of public sector 
bodies that undertake general counter 
fraud awareness training.
Figure 16. Percentage of FTSE 100 
companies that undertake general counter 
fraud awareness training.
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The final criterion that we pick out from 
the 13 criteria is that of pursuing sanctions 
beyond merely disciplinary action. As part 
of a broader counter fraud strategy it is 
important to adequately punish fraudsters. 
For many organisations the general policy 
is to just ‘quietly’ dismiss the person. As 
figures 17 and 18 show, only 30 per cent 
of the public bodies and 63 per cent of 
the FTSE 100 companies would pursue 
sanctions beyond disciplinary action. This 
shows many are missing out on a major 
part of a counter fraud strategy - that of 
sending the message that a fraudster might 
not only lose their job, but may also face 
civil and criminal actions. 
Figure 17. Percentage of public sector 
organisations who pursue sanctions beyond 
disciplinary action. 
Figure 18. Percentage of FTSE 100 
companies who pursue sanctions beyond 
disciplinary action.
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This Report considers the effectiveness 
of counter fraud arrangements in public 
sector organisations with budgets totalling 
more than a quarter of public expenditure 
and private companies generating over a 
quarter of the UK’s GDP. The results give 
the first ever comparative and economy 
wide view of the situation.
There is serious cause for concern. The 
Report, based on data from 2005 - 2007, 
shows that in the case of public bodies 
only 6 per cent of total expenditure was at 
risk, compared to 55 per cent in the case of 
FTSE 100 companies. This means that in 
the two years before the recession FTSE 
100 companies with a turnover of almost 
£180 billion were not properly protected 
against fraud – a shocking statistic.
The Report also shows that while larger 
public sector organisations have improved 
counter fraud arrangements, many smaller 
public sector bodies did not have adequate 
arrangements in place to counter fraud.
Over recent years there has been a 
general trend to develop and provide 
comparative, UK-wide information about 
different functions. Such information allows 
considered judgements to be made about 
prioritising improvements. The good work 
of the Government’s new National Fraud 
Authority will quicken this trend, but more 
needs to be done.
The concerns which have emerged clearly 
justify a further in-depth analysis of the 
position as it is now. The recommendation 
is that this should be completed as quickly 
as possible.
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Conclusion
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The Right Honourable Frank Field M.P.
Campaigning against poverty and low pay
From 1969-79, Frank Field worked as 
Director of the Child Poverty Action Group, 
during which time it became one of the 
premier pressure groups in the country.
In 1974 he also became Director of the 
Low Pay Unit until 1980. The Unit was 
established to make sure wages councils 
properly protected the rights of workers 
in certain industries. It was the first to 
campaign for a national minimum wage, 
along with Rodney Bickerstaffe, the former 
general secretary of the National Union of 
Public Employees, now Unison; a goal that 
was eventually achieved in 1998.
Parliamentary experience
In 1979, he was elected Member of 
Parliament for Birkenhead and has since 
displayed a unique attachment to his 
constituency. During the 1980s he led 
the campaign to make the Labour Party 
electable, which not only involved the 
very public countering of Trotskyites in 
Birkenhead, but also the development 
of policies which appealed beyond 
the ghettos. To this end, he led the 
transformation of the debate on welfare 
from one that believed in a process of pure 
altruism, to one which had a more sane 
view of human nature.
Between 1980 and 1981 he served as 
Shadow Education and Social Security 
spokesman under the leadership of Michael 
Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship 
of the Social Security Select Committee and 
continued in this role up to 1997. From 
1997-1998 he accepted the position of 
Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair’s 
first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a 
member of the Public Accounts Committee 
between 2002 and 2005.
Other commitments
Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy 
and committed. In 1999 he helped set up 
the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. 
The group has acted as an important 
independent think tank for the cause of a 
long-term, investment led reform to the 
pension system. Between 2001 and 2007 
he chaired the Church Conservation Trust 
helping develop the trust from being one 
primarily concerned with conserving the 
best architectural gems of the Church to 
one which tries to open up such places 
for alternative use. Since 2005, he has 
been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics 
Commission for England which is the 
planning authority for English cathedrals. 
In 2007 he took on the chairmanship of 
the 2011 Trust which has been established 
to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the 
Authorised Version (King James Version) of 
the Bible.
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Jim Gee is Director of Counter Fraud 
Services at Maclntyre Hudson LLP and 
Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies
Jim Gee is one of the leading counter fraud 
specialists in the UK. His accomplishments 
include leading the team which cleaned 
up London Borough of Lambeth in the mid 
to late 1990s; advising Right Honourable 
Frank Field M.P. during his periods as Chair 
of the House of Commons Social Security 
Select Committee and Minister for Welfare 
Reform; and being Director-General of the 
European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption 
Network between 2004 and 2006. 
He was also a senior advisor to the 
Attorney-General concerning the 
Government’s Fraud Review which has 
started to professionalise this country’s 
approach to fraud. Gee’s work in the NHS 
reduced fraud-related losses by up to 60 
per cent, delivering financial benefits to 
the tune of more than £800 million and 
achieving a 12:1 return on the costs of the 
work. 
Mark Button is a Reader at University 
of Portsmouth and Director of the 
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
Mark Button is a Reader in Criminology and 
Associate Head Curriculum at the Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies, University of 
Portsmouth. He has also recently founded 
the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies of 
which he is Director. 
He has written extensively on counter fraud 
and private policing issues, publishing 
many articles, chapters and completing 
four books with one forthcoming: Private 
Security (published by Perpetuity Press and 
co-authored with the Rt. Hon. Bruce George 
MP), Private Policing (published by Willan), 
Security Officers and Policing (Published 
by Ashgate), Doing Security (Published by 
Palgrave), and Understanding Fraud: Issues 
in White Collar Crime (to be published by 
Palgrave in early 2010 and co-authored). He 
is also a Director of the Security Institute, 
and Chairs its Academic Board, and a 
member of the editorial advisory board of 
‘Security Journal’. 
Mark founded the BSc (Hons) in Risk and 
Security Management, the BSc (Hons) in 
Counter Fraud and Criminal Justice Studies 
and the MSc in Counter Fraud and Counter 
Corruption Studies at Portsmouth University 
and is Head of Secretariat of the Counter 
Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
(CFPAB). Before joining the University 
of Portsmouth he worked as a Research 
Assistant to the Rt. Hon. Bruce George MP 
specialising in policing, security and home 
affairs issues. 
He completed his undergraduate studies 
at the University of Exeter, his Masters at 
the University of Warwick and his Doctorate 
at the London School of Economics. Mark 
is currently working on a research project 
funded by the National Fraud Strategic 
Authority and ACPO looking at victims of 
fraud. 
Kwabena Frimpong, Research 
Associate at the Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies
Kwabena has an interest in the 
professionalisation of counter fraud 
specialists. He was educated at Portsmouth 
University with a BSc (Hons) in business 
administration, Masters in Information 
Systems, CertHE in Risk and Security 
Management and a PGCert in Research 
Methods. 
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About MacIntyre Hudson LLP
Established in 1880, we are a growing 
and successful mid tier UK independent 
accountancy firm working with 
entrepreneurial businesses, groups and 
multinationals with operations in the UK.
We provide a comprehensive range of 
services and specialist advice, including 
audit and assurance, tax planning and 
compliance for both corporate and individual 
clients, payroll and VAT, corporate recovery, 
business strategy and outsourcing. Other 
parts of the MacIntyre Hudson Group 
provide specialist advice on corporate 
finance and professional training.
www.macintyrehudson.co.uk
The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
The University of Portsmouth’s Centre for 
Counter Fraud Studies (CCFS) was founded 
in June 2009 and is one of the specialist 
research centres in the University’s Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies. It was founded 
to establish better understanding of fraud 
and how to combat it through rigorous 
research. The Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies is home to researchers from a wide 
cross-section of disciplines and provides a 
clear focus for research, knowledge transfer 
and educational provision to the counter 
fraud community. The Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies makes its independent 
research findings available to support those 
working in counter fraud by providing 
the latest and best information on the 
effectiveness of counter fraud strategies.
www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/
icjs/CentreforCounterFraudStudies/
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